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Abstract
The article suggests that there are underexplored possibilities for fruitful communication between formal and 
functionalist linguistics. A key issue is the question of exactly what each approach is aiming to capture about language. 
This is especially relevant for understanding the status of claims about autonomy. The role of distributional regularities 
and their precise relations with semantic motivation is argued to be a shared problem that could fruitfully be addressed 
from both sides of the divide – and the role of niche construction as a dimension of evolutionary theory is put forward 
as providing a new take on the innateness debate. Torben Thrane’s work is discussed as an illustration example.
1. Introduction
This article is about the confl icting perspectives on linguistics taken by the research communi-
ties that are generally known as ‘formal’ and ‘functional’ linguistics – as represented by (respec-
tively) Torben Thrane and myself. The aim is not to confront them, but to stand back in order to 
propose a meta-perspective that might make a constructive discussion between them easier. The 
background for this proposal is my recent work (Harder 2010) on language as a social phenom-
enon. As a spinoff from trying to get clearer about the nature of language-in-society as an object 
of description, some conclusions about the nature of language-in-mind have offered themselves, 
some of which may present new ways of addressing familiar bones of contention. The nature of 
this aim means that the article concludes in questions (albeit leading questions!) rather than as-
sertions: If we adopt this approach, perhaps it will be easier to throw light on the same issue from 
our different perspectives?
2. Aims and objects of description
It is striking how many separate sub-issues Torben Thrane and I have been in agreement about 
over the years. They include the need for a clear distinction between statements about language 
use and about language structure; the instructional nature of linguistic meaning; the claim that lin-
guistic representations stand on the shoulders of primary, pre-linguistic representations – and that 
structures based on functor-operator relations are central to the way linguistic meanings collabo-
rate. 
The reason why these partial agreements have not combined into a broader and more coherent 
agreement is to do with the nature of the object(s) of description that are associated with our over-
all approach. Differences between presupposed objects of description are obvious in the case of 
hyphenated disciplines such as sociolinguistics and psycholinguistics, but they exist also between 
people who simply understand each other as ‘linguists’. 
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If we view the issue historically, the core object of description has changed several times. Clas-
sic traditional grammar arose in a universe centred on culturally focal written texts, and main-
tained the relationship as part of a broadly philological conception of the humanities, until the 
structualist revolution divided the paths. But the core object of description differed also between 
the different structuralists. Thus American structuralism was formed by the need to describe lan-
guages without a written tradition, and stayed close to the data – while European structuralism 
was inspired by rather theoretical notions and worked with the languages that were already famil-
iar from traditional grammar. Generative grammar, while structural in orientation, was part of the 
cognitive revolution where the idea of formal simulation was central, and changed the focus to 
formal mechanisms assumed to underlie the distinction between grammatical and ungrammatical 
sentences. Later, semantics has come to play an increasing role within this cognitive generation 
of linguists, while maintaining ‘language in the mind’ as the core object. My own preoccupation 
has been to take the step to a societal perspective on language, which includes but is not limited 
to cognition.
Torben Thrane and I both became linguists during the generative pioneer age. The reason we 
ended up adopting different perspectives was not a propensity to adopt a particular faith as ‘true 
believers’, but simply that we gravitated towards positions in the linguistic landscape with differ-
ent types of focal features (with different attractions). For that reason, I believe the differences of 
perspective may be symptomatic for other language persons.
Generative grammar had many attractive features as part of the cognitive revolution. The idea 
that there had to be underlying mental structures in order to make language use possible appeared 
uncontrovertible, once the black box had been declared open. The computer metaphor also ap-
peared both intellectually and practically promising as a format for offering theoretical explana-
tions that were both complex and falsifi able, compared with the traditional practice of offering 
competing verbal formulations with uncertain falsifi ability criteria. Chomsky also offered linguis-
tics a position as part of the vanguard, along with Marr’s theory of vision, in the new drive to close 
the last frontier for science: the human mind. There was much to be fascinated with.
One point that was decisive for my own orientation was the issue of how far you can get by 
pursuing a descriptive strategy that takes language ’in reality’ to be of the same kind as language 
in the formal mechanism – especially as a way to account for meaning. Formal simulation as a 
descriptive strategy tones the description in the direction of ever-subtler attunement to distribu-
tional distinctions, allowing a gradually more abstract hierarchical representation which in princi-
ple could end up with, cf. Pinker/Jackendoff (2005), up to seventeen abstract nodes in the clause 
representation. While empirical falsifi cation was a strong point precisely in relation to distribu-
tion, however, the relation with meaning and understanding was not equally safeguarded – and 
that dimension was more appealing from my point of view.
Even so, the phenomena that trigger descriptive choices are if not the same, then to a consid-
erable extent overlapping. Moreover, the two sides can gain from being pursued in tandem. One 
thing that painstaking distributional analysís can reveal (cf. Thrane 2003b on ‘degree phrases’) 
is that in a given case there may be no connection that can be attributed to the distribution-based 
generative hierarchy (in contrast to what previous models assumed): a combination of inherent 
semantic features and an instructional semantics matches the facts much better that abstract dis-
tributional categories. 
This is an example of the fact that functionalists can also benefi t from the discipline that is en-
forced by a formal model that generates potential counterexamples. Most functionalist models 
overgenerate without triggering much concern among the authors (as pointed out by Russell Tom-
lin on many occasions) – and this is a problem that needs addressing. Thrane (2003a) on Danish 
sikke is a contribution to the careful mapping out of differences in terms of distributional classes 
in English and Danish with obvious potential links to a function-based account. Let me mention 
in passing also Klinge’s dissertation (2005) on NP-structure which shows a difference between 
Danish and English that is only visible if you are more careful about distributional classes than 
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most functionalists. The question is how to conceive of an object of description that makes a col-
laborative approach more accessible.
3. Autonomy and context
The key issue is probably the autonomy issue and its reverse side, the relations between language 
and context. Whenever that debate fl ares up, a pattern of mutual misunderstanding reasserts itself. 
Roughly speaking, functionalists believe that generativistst regard language as pure disconnected 
structure, while generativists believe that functionalists try to derive structure directly from func-
tion – and both parties vehemently deny these absurd allegations. 
Among aspects of the complicated truth are that both parties operate with structural as well as 
semantic properties, and both parties would like to make them fi t as tightly as possible. The cru-
cial difference is associated with the point of departure from which these issues are approached. 
One side starts out with ‘language as such’ and postpones the issue of how it functions, arguing 
basically from an analogy that just as it does not make sense to ask about the function of an or-
gan such as a thumb or spleen before you have described that organ, so it does not make sense to 
inquire about the function of language except on the basis of a description of language (as such). 
The other side starts out with language-in-function and postpones the issue of structural proper-
ties, arguing basically that what really exists is linguistic interaction, and unless structure is de-
scribed based on that, it is hypostatized and ontologically dubious. Basically, the two parties think 
each others’s project is doomed to fail. 
Although Thrane basically aligns himself with the fi rst option, his approach includes ’canoni-
cal’ functions, cf. Thrane (2009). While I basically take the second approach, I attach great im-
portance to the distinction between structure and usage based on a notion of autonomy, albeit one 
based on a distinction between ‘partial’ or ‘weak’ autonomy on the one hand and ‘absolute’ or 
‘strong’ autonomy on the other. Strong autonomy means that a domain follows only its own laws 
and is sealed off from outside infl uences. Weak autonomy means that a domain on the one hand 
shares properties and factors of infl uence with surrounding domains, but in addition it has prop-
erties that are special to the domain itself. The two senses are easy to confl ate because the typical 
case is that autonomy is weak but the focus is so strongly on the autonomous properties that the 
others are forgotten. 
If these two concepts are confused – and in my experience this is what typically happens in 
linguistic discussions – the result is an acrimonious but almost entirely meaningless discussion. 
In point of fact, everybody agrees that language is weakly autonomous in the sense that linguis-
tic properties cannot be predicted exhaustively from extralinguistic properties. In contrast, I have 
yet to hear an argument explicitly (and compellingly) defending absolute autonomy. Even the 
most abstract generalizations, including the most promising candidates for universal status, can 
be understood as (partially) associated with functional features. Seeing them as ‘pure structure’ 
is a preferred stance, not an empirical necessity. What takes the place of an argument for (and 
against) absolute autonomy is usually an argument about particular linguistic categories, such as 
‘subject’ or ‘gender’, where one side is trying to maximize motivation and the other side is trying 
to minimize it – or, from the other end of the spectrum, one side is trying to minimize the role of 
structural categories while the other side is trying to maximize it. The point where understanding 
inevitably fails is where generativists take the step from asserting the existence of structural prop-
erties to attributing them to a special compartment in the theory, while functionalists take the step 
of placing structural properties in relation to functional properties.
My point in this article is that this is essentially a matter of descriptive preference and cannot be 
settled by the evidence. Just as you can choose to go for ‘pure structure’, you can choose to start at 
the structural end – or at the functional end. What can (at least in principle) be settled by empirical 
evidence is the question of motivation: How strong is the correlation between functional potential 
and structural categorization, for each of the structural categories we are interested in? The debate 
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on autonomous structure takes other forms as well, but this is well suited as an example of how 
the unproductive polarization can be avoided: to look for the aspects of the problem that can be 
linked with empirical predictions and leave the rest to internal meetings between true believers. 
As pointed out by Croft (1995) in an argument against extreme reliance on functional motivation, 
there is no way to avoid arbitrariness – on the other hand, there is also no way to avoid motivation 
(why else would speakers sometimes prefer one way of speaking to another?). 
My own general strategy is to view the task of describing language as such as inherently bound 
up with the description of language in function: Properties specifi c to the domain of language can 
only be identifi ed as part of a process where the other properties are also in play. Roughly speak-
ing, the decision to treat a linguistic category as wholly and absolutely autonomous of all exter-
nal factors could only be taken once you had actually tested out whether there was a signifi cant 
correlation with any of the likely candidates for motivating factors. And for all partially autono-
mous cases, a precise description is one that captures both the correlations between the structural 
categories and motivating factors and also describes cases where motivation fails to predict the 
linguistic facts.
This approach is conceived within an evolutionary perspective (see also the next section). Evo-
lution, however, involves both a set of biological processes and a set of cultural processes. While 
generative grammar has been most concerned with the biological dimension (because of the in-
nateness issue), there must have been cultural evolution also: an ’African Eve’ (= the fi rst indi-
vidual to carry the language gene) cannot have opened conversation by saying ’whose banana did 
Joe steal [gap]? Linguistic communication must have evolved on the basis of presupposed, non-
linguistic resources (cognitive and interactive), which therefore have a share in determining what 
a grammatical sentence comes to look like.
This does not rule out a choice of focus on the fully formed, stable, linguistíc infrastructure in 
the individual, as the prioritized object of description – thus continuing the generative agenda. 
However, it means that this interesting object came with presupposed sociocultural foundations, 
and the larger object of description that includes those foundations is part of the general scientifi c 
endeavour. This is where I see (although possibly we will have to wait until Chomsky retires de-
fi nitively!) a possibility of converting a religious war into a division of labour. It is clearly one of 
the tasks of linguistics to develop a model of the infrastructure that underlies the ability to produce 
the kinds of sentences that enter into an individual’s language. Equally clearly, it is a task of lin-
guistics to describe the kinds of sentences that are found in actual linguistic interaction in a given 
community. The central problem is probably going to be to get people to see what kind of sense it 
makes to start from the other (~’wrong’) end.
4. E-language and evolutionary theory: populations, niches and culture
From the formal or generative side, a major stumbling block will be the question of what precise-
ly E-language is. It is by no means obvious how to solve the problem of taming E-language as a 
manageable object of description – all types of functionalists have to produce their own types of 
abstractions in order to get a grip on the raw and multifarious sprawl of linguistic communica-
tion. The point in this connection is that even from a generative point of view, it needs to be done. 
The reason is the scenario I argued for above: without a cultural component, the genetic compo-
nent would not be able to give rise to sentences of the kind that constitute the input to linguistic 
description. If we ignore that part of it, looking only for properties that can be put down to ge-
netically shaped infrastructure, linguistics will be in the position of looking for the key under the 
streetlight because that is the only place where there is (what we recognize as) light. 
Cultural evolution has the same type of causal dynamics as biological evolution – but not the 
same mechanisms. All evolutionary dynamics depends on two levels: individual and population 
(cf. Croft’s evolutionary theory of language change (2000), based on Hull (1988). Reproduction 
(of utterances and DNA) belong at the individual level, while selection and proliferation are pop-
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ulation-level phenomena – which in a linguistic context means a social, community-level phe-
nomenon. To the extent properties of individuals refl ect selection pressures, this is a social, pop-
ulation-level feature, not a purely individual-level feature. Analogously, wearing the fashionable 
colours of the season is not the result purely of internal wiring.
This is bound up with the process whereby linguistic expressions gain ’currency’ (another so-
cial phenomenon). The comparison with fashion may suggest that this is merely a surface phe-
nomenon – but on refl ection, it will be clear that a language does not exist in a community unless 
it has ‘currency’. Hence, according to a functional approach, having community-wide ’curren-
cy’ is not an external, but possibly the most foundational feature of language. The existence of a 
linguistic feature in the community therefore has to be understood in relation to the factors that 
contribute to making it ‘current’ – i.e. the process of evolution, including cultural evolution. This 
observation is related to Dobzhansky’s claim that nothing in biology makes sense except in the 
light of evolution. Neither biological organs nor linguistic expressions can be understood except 
as constituents of a larger whole that includes individuals and populations existing in a dynamic 
equilibrium. It is still okay to describe a single animal or organ – but this is a choice you make, 
which requires you to carve it out from a context that is not in a foundational sense external to the 
object you are describing.
This entails that biological species and expressions are ’lineages’, cf. Croft (2000). They exist 
in a panchronic space, from which both synchronic and diachronic descriptions are abstractions. 
Such lineages (like the horse lineage from eohippus to equus) are partly the results of selection 
pressures, partly also the sources of selection pressures – prey and raptor species ’co-evolve’. 
Lineages therefore infl uence each other – and thus they also infl uence also the world they live in. 
This last process is called ’niche construction’. A classic example is the beaver: beavers are 
adapted to a landscape with ponds – built by beavers, cf. Deacon (1997). Lactose tolerance is an 
example from human evolution: in a culture that keeps cattle, there is a selective advantage in 
being able to digest milk But because human beings also adapt to other minds, evolutionary dy-
namics can run on other things than DNA. Language change is a form of cultural evolution, like 
changes in institutional practices (such as the legal system): at any given time there is an evolving 
cultural niche to which new members adapt (even while they change it).
The combination of niche construction and cultural evolution provides a scientifi cally re-
spectable home for language as something that exists in the individual’s environment rather than 
as something that exists only inside the individual. In my terminology, the language system (= 
‘langue’) is part of the niche – while competency (please note the ’-y’!) is what arises in the indi-
vidual’s mind as a result of the process of adaptation. There is of course an innate point of depar-
ture for this process, but I am going to leave that issue aside here. What matters for the purposes 
of this article is the internalized competency that represents a fi nished state of adaptation in the 
individual. As will be evident in the subsequent section, I believe this corresponds to I-language 
as described by Torben Thrane.
In order to get a complete picture of linguistic facts, we therefore have to distinguish several re-
lated, but different objects of description – all of which are part of the whole evolutionary process. 
Niche elements function as ’affordances’ – as things that can be understood by the individual (if 
he has the key!), and which yield a selective advantage to those who do. ’Competency’-elements 
constitute the key: they function as tools for the individual, and in combination they constitute a 
quasi-organ.
The larger landscape that I have tried to depict in this section thus includes objects of descrip-
tion inside individuals (competencies), and it also comprises a cultural niche (including other 
people’s linguistic interaction) to which individuals adapt. I am going to argue that this provides 
a framework that allows for the empirical pursuit of both generative and functionalt interests – 
provided some adjustments are made in the generative picture. (Otherwise we’ll just have to con-
tinue the quarrel!)
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5. Towards a shared geography of linguistics?
Torben Thrane’s object of description is basically the Chomskyan I-language, but it includes a 
strong element of functionality – pure formal structure is not enough. This is why I think his lin-
guistic project would be able to accommodate to the linguistic landscape I have tried to outline. 
As illustrations, I have selected some passages dealing with core theoretical issues:
 Skal man nu give en internt-systematisk beskrivelse af, og forklaring på, bilens indretning ud fra ek-
sterne, kommuter-sociale kriterier? Eller skal man opfatte dens strukturelle indretning ud fra hvad der 
er teknisk og naturvidenskabeligt mulige løsninger på?( ...) det er principielt muligt at forklare biler 
både ud fra det kommuter-sociale synspunkt og ud fra det teknisk-naturvidenskabelige. Men jeg vil 
som min personlige holdning gå ud fra at den sidste er den fornuftigste hvis man vil sige noget om 
bilens strukturelle indretning. (Thrane 2008: 140)
 (My translation: Should we now offer an internally systematic description of, and explanation for, the 
construction of the car based on external ’commuter-social’ criteria? Or should we try to understand 
its structural setup based on what is technically and scientifi cally feasible? (…) it is possible in prin-
ciple to explain cars both from the commuter-social point of view and the technical-scientifi c point of 
view. But as my personal preference I assume that that last option is the most sensible one if you want 
to say something about the car’s structural construction) (Thrane 2008: 140)
 Sprogevnens initialtilstand er genetisk bestemt og defi nerer under navnet ’Universal Grammar’ det 
sproglige fællesgods for mennesker. I løbet af individets opvækst, og under miljømæssig påvirkning, 
gennemløber sprogevnen en række tilstandsændringer for at munde ud i en såkaldt stabil tilstand. Sta-
bile tilstande er I-sprog. I-sprog er med andre ord det der ligger bag et individs evne til at producere 
og forstå sproglige udtryk. (Thrane 2004)
 (My translation: The initial point of the language acquisition process is genetically determined and 
(under the name of ‘Universal Grammar’) defi nes the shared linguistic equipment of human beings. 
During the maturation of the individual, and under impact from the environment, the language abil-
ity undergoes a series of changes, eventuating in a so-called stable state. Stable states are I-languages. 
I-languages, in other words, are what underlies an individual’s ability to produce and understand lin-
guistic expressions.) (Thrane 2004).
In [Chomsky’s] programme, HLF [= the human language faculty] is assumed to be neutral with 
respect to production and reception of utterances, on the grounds that it would be ’unnatural’ to 
assume that we were endowed with two radically distinct faculties, one for production and one for 
reception and understanding. This may appear to be a reasonable view, but the fact remains that 
production and reception are radically distinct processes. It is therefore only a reasonable view at 
a level of abstraction at which HLF is regarded as an insulated system, closed off relative to other 
cognitive systems, a system that can be shown to be relevantly engaged in both production and re-
ception, but which at the same time can be shown to remain immune from those factors that make 
production and reception different processes, a sort of “brain in a vat”.
 This view is a priori. Rejecting it, or rather suspending judgement on it to be confi rmed or falsifi ed by 
empirical evidence, this paper will discuss some of the key issues in Chomsky’s programme with a view 
to determining whether it is equipped to answer what I take to be a more legitimate a priori question: 
How can we explain the manifest human ability to understand linguistic utterances as vehicles for the 
expression of thoughts and ideas? (Thrane 2009: 2)
The stable mind-internal end state described in the last quote above appears to me to be equiva-
lent to what I call ‘competency’. For reasons described above, this object of description has many 
of those properties that are sometimes mistakenly assumed to go with strong autonomy. Distribu-
tional regularities are a key part of the structural complexity of language in both its I and E mani-
festations; individual ‘competency’ has an innate foundation, but in its end state it refl ects adapta-
tion to linguistic ‘affordances’ in the community – as also pointed out by Thrane as quoted above. 
I discreetly add that a complete theory thus requires a description of the language that exists 
outside the individual and exerts selection pressure on acquisition, and the distinction between 
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grammatical and ungrammatical utterances thus cannot be captured merely by reference to mind-
internal constructs – although you can choose to focus on internal aspects.
From this point of view, functionalists and formalists have a shared duty to fi gure out how to 
clear up the mixture of isomorphism and divergence between semantic and distributional proper-
ties. This requires both parties to resist the temptation to go for complete isomorphism based on 
their own favourite view of what is ‘basic’.
6. Final issues and questions
Although my orientation is strongly towards a shared wider object of description that can ac-
commodate core concerns of both generativists and functionalists, it would be misleading to sug-
gest that one can avoid theoretical confrontation in some points. The two major issues, as far as 
I can see, involve the way linguistic infrastructure is conceived. I hope to drive a wedge between 
Chomsky and Torben Thrane, leaving the latter and myself on the same side of the fence. 
First, there is the question of the level of concretion of the object of description that constitutes 
the infrastructure. Once more, the issue is linked to the status of ‘pure structure’ as a preferred 
stance rather than as part of the ontology, i.e. part of the assumed object of description. If my lan-
guage is a car (cf. the fi rst quote above), it would appear to be necessary to see it as including both 
the reception and the production apparatus (analogous to forward and reverse gears). A neutral 
description may be a preferred stance, but it cannot be part of the object of decription that is given 
before the linguist starts his work (cf. extract 3). Differently put, if language is an organ, it must 
constitute whatever is necesssary to deliver the goods, not just something that can in a technical 
sense generate ‘all-and-only the grammatical sentences of the language’. (Just as the liver, with 
Newmeyer’s analogy (1998), has to be described in terms of its actual capacity to process input 
from the organism, not just in terms of structural abstractions). Similarly, the I-language/compe-
tency that linguists describe is the fully adapted ability to speak as a member of the community, 
not just the abstract general features.
If that is so, it also appears to me that what one describes is a ‘can-do capacity’ – not a ‘tacit 
knowledge’ that is claimed to differ from ability (cf. Chomsky 1980: 59). There is a type of pro-
cess that is generally recognized to work in a manner that is sealed off from intentions and mental 
content, namely procedural ability, and it is plausible to assume that a fully developed and stable 
language ability has a strong procedural component. In that sense it is also analogous to the walk-
ing ability – an illustration that has been invoked to illustrate the status of the innate language 
ability. But the level of purely structural abstractions (that constitute tacit knowledge but not abil-
ity) again appears to be ontologically epiphenomenal. 
What this article asks, therefore, is whether this is not compatible with a pursuit of the genera-
tive agenda in linguistics – in which case I think collaboration is feasible. Although these ques-
tions should perhaps not be raised as the fi rst item on the agenda when a shared geography is to 
be hammered out, I think answering them will be necessary at some point in the process – other-
wise the polarization will return!
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